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A GLANCE AT THE PAST, A GAZE AT THE PRESENT, A
GLIMPSE AT THE FUTURE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING STATUTES
BRIAN G. FRASER*
Child abuse used to be called an ugly secret. It remains ugly but
it is no longer a secret.
Child abuse is not a phenomenon of the Twentieth Century. Chil-
dren have been physically traumatized, neglected, molested and de-
prived since the dawn of man's earliest recorded history. It was not
until 1962, however, that it was formally identified as an observable,
clinical condition, and, it was not until the early 1970's that America
accepted it as a problem of devastating proportions.
To believe that child abuse can ever be completely eradicated is
naive. It is possible, however, to reduce its incidence. To accomplish
this will require a different perspective, a more creative delivery system
and a more coordinated effort.
America and its institutions have a nasty habit of reacting to
problems. Remedial solutions are often viewed as prudent solutions;
they are not. A reaction to the problem after the fact is cruel; cruel in
terms of human suffering and dollars spent. Institutions, if they are to
be effective, must become more adept at anticipating solutions.
To successfully anticipate solutions requires a careful planning
process. American institutions, however, usually do not plan. They
labor under a different assumption. In child abuse, for example, the
federal government funds numerous demonstration programs, resource
programs and research efforts. There is a belief that these diverse pro-
grams will magically coalesce at some future point in time. From this
amalgam of services and programs, it is believed that a comprehensive,
coordinated national program will develop, a program which will eval-
uate its needs and define future goals and objectives. It will not.
Today, America faces a glut of large and costly social problems. Its
resources are scarce and taut. To believe that the federal and state
* Executive Director of the National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse; J.D. Uni-
versity of Colorado School of Law.
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governments will continue to appropriate ever-increasing resources to
deal with these problems is simplistic. They will not. To meet current
and future needs, America has two options. It can cast a critical eye,
evaluate the distribution of current resources, draft priorities and redis-
tribute those resources. Or, alternatively, it can critically evaluate the
distribution of current resources and attempt to make the system more
efficient. Realistically, the first alternative is not likely to occur. The
second could.
If, over the next decade, America is going to be successful in re-
ducing the incidence of child abuse, a different perspective is necessary.
A system is needed which is geared to anticipate solutions and not
merely react to problems. It must begin to plan prudently and learn to
become more efficient. This article deals with child abuse legislation,
particularly the reporting statutes. Reporting statutes evolved in the
early 1960's as a reaction to the problem. During the late 1960's and
into the early 1970's the reporting statute began to go through a period
of metamorphosis. It began to broaden its scope and address tangential
issues. Today, child abuse legislation could be described as standing
on the threshold. Legislation could begin to address the issues of plan-
ning, coordination, allocation of resources and prevention. On the
other hand, it could stagnate.
To know where you want to go and how to get there, it is some-
times wise to determine where you have been and where you are now.
This article deals with where we have been and where we are now. It
is a chronological review of the reporting statute and the factors which
have had a substantial impact on its form.
CHILD ABUSE
The mandatory reporting statute has been substantially affected by
three factors: the problem itself; the delivery system; and the federal
government.
The Problem1
Child abuse was originally defined in 1962 as a non-accidental
physical injury3 It was a simple and narrow definition which reflected
what was known at the time. In recent years our knowledge of in-
1. See generally THE BATTERED CHILD (2d ed. Kempe & Heifer 1968); CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY (C.H. Kempe & R.E. Heifer eds. 1976); HELPING
THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY (C.H. Kempe & R.E. Heifer eds. 1974).
2. See generally Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuefler & Silver, The Battered-Child
Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
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flicted trauma has increased. As our understanding of the incidence,
medical pathology and family dynamics involved increased, our defini-
tion grew.
3
Today, the term child abuse has a much broader meaning. It is a
generic term.4 In the simplest of terms, it is damage to a child for
which there is no reasonable explanation. Child abuse is usually not a
single physical attack or a single act of molestation or deprivation.' It
is typically a pattern of behavior.6 Its effects are cumulative. The
longer it continues, the more serious the damage.'
Each state defines child abuse differently. Although definitions
vary, all are a combination of two or more of the following elements: a
non-accidental physical injury;8 sexual molestation;9 emotional abuse
or mental injury;' 0 and neglect."
The elements of non-accidental physical injury and sexual moles-
tation can be defined specifically (although they often are not). Ne-
glect and emotional abuse cannot; they are standards of behavior.' 2
They reflect community values and cultural biases and are standards
which should reflect the level of care and support that a child is entitled
to receive or the level of care and support a parent is required to pro-
3. See F.B. SUSSMAN & F.S. COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1974).
4. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 103, 106 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pragmatic Alternative].
5. A number of courts have formally recognized the fact that child abuse is a series of inju-
ries or a pattern of behavior. State ex rel Thaxton, 220 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1969); In re Young,
50 Misc. 2d 271, 274, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 250, 253 (1966); In re K.D.E., 210 N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D.
1973).
6. Thirty to forty per cent of the parents involved in a case of child abuse have been involved
in a previous case of child abuse. In twenty-seven per cent of the families involved in a case of
child abuse, siblings of the most recent victim also have been victims of child abuse. GIL, ViO-
LENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (1972).
7. One respected authority in the field of child abuse has suggested that fifty per cent of the
children who are hospitalized for child abuse will be dead within a year-victims of another
episode of child abuse. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 109 (1973).
8. See Schmitt & Kempe, Pediatricians' Role in Child Abuse and Neglect, 5 CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS 1 (1975).
9. See May, SexualAbuse: The Undercover Problem, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS
(1977); Schultz, The Child Sex Victin" Social, Psychological and Legal Perspectives, 52 CHILD
WELFARE 147 (1973); Sgroi, Sexual Molestation of Children. The Last Frontier in Child Abuse, 4
CHILDREN TODAY 18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sgroi].
10. Comment, Emotional Neglect in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 100 (1972).
11. See generally Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child" A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in ChildNeglect andAbuse Cases, 63 GEO. L. J. 887 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areen]; Wald,
State Intervention on Behalfof "Neglected" Children.,A Searchfor Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L.
RaV. 985 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wald, Realistic Standards]; Wald, State Intervention on Be-
hal/of "Neglected" Children.- Standards/or Removal of Children from their Homes, Monitoring the
Status ofChildren in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Wald, Standards/or Removal.
12. In re Stacey, 16 Ill. App. 3d 179, 183, 305 N.E.2d 634, 638 (1973).
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vide. 13
It is estimated that between 665,000 and 1,675,000 children are
physically abused, sexually assaulted or seriously neglected each year. 4
Nationally it is estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 children die
each year as a direct result of child abuse. 5
It is impossible to characterize the abusing adult by the color of his
skin, his ethnic heritage, his religious preference, his income or his edu-
cational background. Child abuse cuts across the complete spectrum
of American society. 16
Child abuse is a complex and eclectic problem. It does not belong
to the medical profession, the legal profession or the social work pro-
fession. No one discipline provides a complete solution. No one has
been able to determine with any specificity why child abuse takes
place. 17 At best, it can be said that there are four factors which seem to
be indigenous to child abuse. (1) Child abuse seems to be a learned or
conditioned behavior. In most cases of child abuse, it is likely that one
or both parents were physically abused, neglected or deprived as chil-
dren. (2) The parents are isolated. They have no friends, relatives or
neighbors who can be called upon in times of crises. (3) The parents
have unrealistic expectations for their children. (4) There is a crisis of
some sort which precedes and precipitates the abusive incident. When
these four factors come together and coalesce in a family, child abuse is
likely to occur.
If child abuse legislation 8 is to be effective, it must respond to all
of the above problems. It must provide a mechanism to identify the
child in peril at the earliest possible point in time. The various elements
of child abuse must be defined as specifically as possible. Standards,
as far as is possible, must be reasonable, readable and applicable. Ef-
fective child abuse legislation must remain cognizant of the extent of
the problem. It must pragmatically weigh the sheer number of persons
13. See text accompanying notes 68-69, infra.
14. See Light, Abused and Neglected Children in America. A Study 0/Alternative Policies, 43
HARV. EDUC. REV. 556, 567 (1973).
15. See Kempe, Approaches to Preventing Child Abuse, 130 AM. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN
941, 945 (1976).
16. See Gil, Incidence of Child Abuse and Demographic Characteristics of Persons Involved,
THE BATrERED CHILD 19-39 (1968); Steele and Pollack, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse
Children and Small Infants, THE BATTERED CHILD 89, 92-94 (1974).
17. For a general discussion of why child abuse takes place see Heifer, The Diagnostic Process
and Treatment Programs, Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office (1975) (Dept. H.E.W. Pub. No.
(OHD) 75-9) [hereinafter cited as Heifer, Diagnostic Process].
18. For a more complete discussion of how the system deals with child abuse, see Fraser,
Independent Representation/or the Abused and Neglected Child" The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL.
L. REV. 16, 22-25 (1976-77).
REPORTING STATUTES
affected against the limited resources and define what can be reason-
ably accomplished. Legislation which requires treatment for every
abused child and his parents, when no resources exist, is shortsighted
and self-defeating. Effective legislation must account for and make pro-
vision for different cultures and different values.' 9 It must create a
mechanism which combines different disciplines and different forms of
expertise. By combining disciplines and expertise, a more effective de-
livery system will be obtained and the complex issues involved in child
abuse will be resolved. Finally, legislation which deals only with the
final result is a remedial approach and has limited value.
The System
The successful resolution of any case of child abuse requires three
steps. The first is the identification of the child believed to have been
abused. The second is an investigation to determine if the child has
indeed been abused. And the third is the delivery of services and treat-
ment to the abused child and his family. The current child abuse sys-
tem is a remedial system. It becomes operational only after the child
has been abused. What resources are available are used to alleviate
the damage which has already been inflicted.
Identification
The first step in resolving any case of child abuse is to identify the
child in peril. To ensure that reports of child abuse are made and to
facilitate the reporting process, every state has enacted into law a
mandatory reporting statute.2° Unfortunately, there is little uniformity.
Every state has enacted its own reporting statute. As a result, defini-
tions, standards and procedures vary from state to state. Although
definitions and standards vary, all reporting statutes have a common
purpose and a common format.
The purpose of each reporting statute is to identify the child be-
lieved to have been abused. To accomplish this all states have adopted
a similar format. Child abuse is defined. Selected individuals, usually
professionals, are mandated to report when they believe a child has
been abused. At least one statewide agency is designated to receive
these reports and investigate them. To encourage reporting, immunity
19. The State of Colorado has attempted to address this problem by making provision for
representatives of different minoritites and the general public to serve on county child protection
teams. COLO. RV. STAT. § 19-10-103(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
20. See EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, REPORT No. 106 TRENDS IN CHILD PROTEC-
TION LAWS-1977, 22-24 app. (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION-1977].
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is provided for good faith reports, or criminal or civil provisions are
provided for non-compliance and the status of certain privileged com-
munications is abrogated.
Since the first reporting statute was enacted in 1962, the number of
reported cases has increased on a yearly basis. Although reports have
increased dramatically, it is generally believed that the majority of
cases of child abuse still go unrecognized and unreported. Effective
child abuse legislation must provide a mechanism to ensure that all
cases of suspected child abuse are properly identified and reported. At
the same time, however, the goal of increasing the number of reports
must be tempered with the knowledge that our present system is al-
ready functioning at or over capacity. Any concerted effort to increase
the number of reports must be matched with an effort to increase the
capacity of the system to deal effectively with those reports.
While it is true that the development of reporting statutes and the
growth of reports have been somewhat parallel, this does not necessar-
ily imply a causal relationship. Reporting statutes have for the most
part focused on professionals. The majority of reports, however, come
from non-professionals-the relative, the next door neighbor, the co-
worker. If reporting is to increase in the future, it will come from an
increased awareness of the general public, not the professional. If in-
creased reporting over the next decade is to be a principal aim of the
reporting statute, it will be necessary to focus on the awareness of the
general public, not specific duties of the professional.
The Investigation
Every state has identified at least one statewide agency to receive
and investigate reports of suspected child abuse. In most states that
agency is the Department of Social Services.
When a report of suspected child abuse is received by the Depart-
ment of Social Services, it is screened (the intake process) and assigned
to an agency caseworker for investigation. It is on the basis of this
investigation that all future actions will hinge. Unfortunately, the ma-
jority of child abuse investigations are not thorough nor properly made.
Over the past few years the number of reports of suspected child
abuse have increased dramatically. Agency personnel which must in-
vestigate the reports, on the other hand, have not increased substan-
tially. The result is an ever decreasing amount of time available to
investigate each case. Since only a small amount of time can be spent
investigating each case, there is a tendency to focus on the reported
injury. But child abuse is a pattern of behavior. The reported injury
646
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in all likelihood is just one small piece of a much larger puzzle. The
investigation which focuses on the reported injury creates a still life
portrait of the child at the time the report was received. The proper
investigation needs to focus on the child's life, not on a single event.
The proper investigation should create a moving picture of the child's
life.
When the investigation has been completed, the caseworker must
resolve three issues. (1) The diagnosis. Is this a case of child abuse?
Can the child's injuries or the parents' behavior be characterized as
child abuse under state law? (2) The prognosis. What are the chances
that treatment for the child and his parents will ultimately prove to be
successful? (3) The treatment plan. What services and treatment
would be appropriate and are available? Unfortunately, because of the
limitations of Departments of Social Services and individual
caseworkers, the resolution of these issues is, at best, minimal.
Furthermore, it is usually an individual caseworker who must re-
solve the issues of diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. But child abuse
is a bit medical pathology, a bit psychiatry, a bit legalese and a bit
social work. To assume that any one individual has substantive exper-
tise in all of these disciplines is naive.
If child abuse legislation is to be effective, it must address the twin
issues of limited resources and limited expertise. To do less is to pro-
vide for identification but to overload the system. Good child abuse
legislation can provide for a more efficient allocation of resources. It
can provide for cooperation and coordination between agencies, train-
ing and education for caseworkers, and the pooling of expertise of dif-
ferent professionals.
Intervention
Intervention simply means the implementation of the treatment
plan. In the majority of cases of child abuse, the implementation of
the treatment plan is on a voluntary basis. It is simply an agreement
by the parents and the Department of Social Services. Voluntary im-
plementation is monitored by the caseworker. When the caseworker
believes that the home environment has stabilized, he will withdraw.
In some cases, however, voluntary intervention is not appropriate.
In cases in which the parents are unwilling to cooperate, the prognosis
is poor, the injuries are severe or there is a pattern of past abuses, an-
other intervention strategy must be used. Involuntary intervention sim-
ply means that the treatment plan is implemented and monitored by a
court.
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Both voluntary and involuntary intervention rest on one assump-
tion: treatment and services are available within the community. In
most communities treatment and services are not available. To the de-
gree possible, child abuse legislation must encourage new treatment
and services. To the extent that this is not possible, good legislation
must make every effort to ensure that what resources are available are
used efficiently.
The Federal Government
On January 31, 1974, the President of the United States signed into
law the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. 2' The Act allo-
cated $85,000,000 for the identification, the treatment and the preven-
tion of child abuse.2 2 Of the sums allocated by this Act, not less than
five per cent and not more than twenty per cent of the total were
specifically earmarked for state use.23 For a state to be eligible for
these funds it must meet ten conditions.24 The state must: (1) Provide
for the reporting of known or suspected child abuse.25 (2) Provide for,
upon receipt of a report of known or suspected child abuse, an investi-
gation by a properly constituted state authority. The investigation
must be made promptly. And if, after the investigation has been com-
pleted, there is a finding of child abuse, the state must provide immedi-
ate action to protect the health and welfare of the abused or neglected
child or any other child in the same home.26 (3) Demonstrate that
there are in effect administrative procedures, trained personnel, train-
ing procedures, institutional and other facilities and multi-disciplinary
programs and services sufficient to assure that the state can deal effec-
tively and efficiently with child abuse. At a minimum this must in-
clude provisions for the receipt, investigation and verification of
reports; provision for the determination of treatment and ameliorative
social services and medical needs; provision of such services; and where
necessary recourse to the criminal or juvenile court. 27 (4) Have in ef-
fect a child abuse and neglect law that provides immunity for persons
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (Supp. IV 1974).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5104. This sum was allocated over a four year period: $15,000,000.00 for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1974; $20,000,000.00 for the 1975 fiscal year, and $25,000,000.00 for the
1976 and 1977 fiscal years.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1). This figure is calculated on the basis of $20,000.00 to each state,
plus an additional sum based upon the ratio of the number of children under 18 years within the
state to the total number of children under 18 years in the country. See also 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-6
(1976).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3 (1976).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
26, 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1974).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1974).
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who report in good faith (civil and criminal).2" (5) Preserve the confi-
dentiality of all records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect
by having in effect, a law that makes such records confidential and
makes any person who permits or encourages the unauthorized dissem-
ination of such records or their contents guilty of a crime.2 9 (6) Estab-
lish cooperation among law enforcement officials, courts of competent
jurisdiction, and all appropriate state agencies providing human serv-
ices for the prevention, treatment and identification of child abuse and
neglect.3" (7) Ensure that in every case of child abuse that results in a
judicial proceeding, there is an appointment of a Guardian Ad Litum
to represent the child.3' (8) Show that the aggregate of state support
for programs or projects related to child abuse are not reduced below
the level provided during the fiscal year 1973.32 (9) Provide for public
dissemination of information on the problem of child abuse as well as
the facilities and the prevention and treatment methods available to
combat it.33 (10) To the extent feasible, insure that parental organiza-
tions combating child abuse and neglect receive preferential treat-
ment.34
It is not necessary for a state to meet all of these conditions by
statute to receive federal support. Some may be satisfied by simply
having a program in place or an attorney general's opinion noting that
certain practices are followed. Nevertheless, the passage of the Act has
had a substantial impact on state reporting statutes.
THE REPORTING STATUTES
A Quick History
The concept of a child abuse reporting statute was first explored in
1962. In 1963, a model reporting statute was proposed by the Chil-
dren's Bureau of H.E.W.35 and in 1965, two other models were devel-
oped and offered to the general public.36  By 1964, twenty states had
28. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1974).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 1974).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (Supp. IV 1974).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(H) (Supp. IV 1974).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(I) (Supp. IV 1974).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(J) (Supp. IV 1974).
35. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE ABUSED
CHILD-PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR THE REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY
ABUSED CHILD (1963) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S BUREAU].
36. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN- SUGGESTED LEG-
ISLATION (1965) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION]; COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, PROGRAM FOR SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION (1965).
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adopted a reporting statute37 and by 1966, forty-nine states had enacted
such a statute.38 Today all fifty states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands have such laws.39 In very few areas have legis-
lative concepts met with such universal acceptance.
The first generation of reporting statutes had a rather simple focus.
Their purpose was to mandate certain professionals to report suspected
cases of child abuse.' It was an identification function. It was be-
lieved that if a case of suspected child abuse could be identified and
funneled into the system, appropriate relief would be provided. It was
an erroneous assumption. As a result, a second generation of reporting
statutes began to emerge."1 The focus of these statutes was identifica-
tion and investigation. It was believed that, if the needs were clearly
identified and if standards were clearly established,42 existing agencies
would provide the appropriate relief. That too proved to be an errone-
ous assumption. As a result, a third generation of reporting statutes
began to emerge.43 In addition to identification and investigation,
these statutes began to address the complex issues of intervention.
These statutes began to address the issues of limited resources,44 lim-
ited expertise,45 lack of coordination,' a need to involve the general
public47 as well as the professionals,48 and the need to establish a plan-
ning component. 9
Every state has enacted into law a mandatory reporting statute.
Unfortunately, every state has enacted its own law,5° and, as a result,
there is little uniformity in the language. There is, however, a common
format.5
37. Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182, 189-90 (1965).
38. Paulsen, The Legal Framework/or Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 711 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Paulsen].
39. Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 104 n.4.
40. See generaly AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36; CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
supra note 35.
41. See B.G. FRASER, THE EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATE, REPORT No. 44, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: ALTERNATIVES FOR STATE LEGISATION (1973) [hereinafter cited as ALTER-
NATIVES FOR STATE LEGISLATION].
42. See generally Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse. A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L. Q.
245 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A Review ofthe Literature].
43. See B.G. FRASER & D. BESHAROV, THE EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, REPORT
No. 71, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FRASER & BESHAROV].
44. See text accompanying notes 251-54, infra.
45. See text accompanying notes 210-11, infra.
46. See notes 251-254, infra.
47. See note 72, 113, 228, infra.
48. See notes 103-11, 210-12, infra.
49. See note 252, infra.
50. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 104.




The purpose clause in reporting statutes has little intrinsic value.
At the most, it reflects the aspirations of the individuals who drafted it.
At the least, it represents standards which were never achieved.
The real purpose of any reporting statute is threefold. First, the
child in peril must be identified as quickly as possible. Second, an
agency to receive and investigate reports of suspected child abuse is
named. Third, the reporting statute offers, where appropriate, services
and treatment.5 3 The stated purpose is often somewhat more grandi-
ose than what can be delivered. 4 Perhaps foreseeing the widening gap
between what was offered and what could be delivered, the American
Medical Association warned in 1964 that such legislation should be re-
alistic.55
The number of states which include a purpose clause in their re-
porting statute has increased over the past few years. In 1973, thirty-
four states included such a clause. 6 In 1977, as reporting statutes be-
came more complex, the number had grown to forty. 7
The Definition of Child Abuse
Every state reporting statute requires that suspected cases of child
abuse be reported. However, every state defines child abuse differ-
ently.58  Child abuse, as stated earlier, is a generic term that can com-
bine up to four elements: non-accidentalphysical injury, neglect, sexual
molestation, mental injury. Every state defines child abuse as a combi-
nation of two or more of these elements.59
GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION (1975); FRASER & BESHAROV, supra note 43; TRENDS IN CHILD
PROTECTION- 1977, supra note 20, at 18-21 app.
52. For a more thorough discussion of the various purposes of a reporting statute see
generally Boardman, A Project to Protect Children from Inflicted Injuries, 7 SOCIAL WORK 43
(1962); Mason, Child Abuse and Neglect, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972).
53. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 105. See also ALTERNATIVES FOR STATE LEG-
ISLATION, supra note 41, at 9.
54. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a (Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. Editorial, 188 J.A.M.A. 386 (1964).
56. See A Review of the Literature, supra note 42, at 248.
57. See TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION-1977, supra note 20, at 19.
58. See TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION-1977, supra note 20, at 18. See also Pragmatic
Alternative, supra note 4, at 106-107.
59. See Fraser, The Educator and Child Abuse, NATIONAL COMMITTEE FoR PREVENTION OF
CHILD ABUSE 1977, at 3. See also TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION-1977, supra 20, at 18-19.
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Non-Accidental Physical Injury
Every state includes non-accidental physical injury in its definition
of child abuse. Non-accidental physical injury means inflicted trauma.
It includes, but is not limited to such things as cuts, bruises, abrasions,
broken bones, strangulation, subdural hematoma and bums.
Most states are not specific; they simply require that non-acciden-
tal physical injuries be reported. A few states, however, are somewhat
more specific. They limit non-accidental injuries to serious ones and
provide specific guidelines.6 °  Colorado, for example, defines non-acci-
dental physical injury as "evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnu-
trition, failure to thrive, bums, fracture to any bone, subdural
hematoma, soft tissue swelling... .61
Corporal punishment is by definition inflicted non-accidental
physical injury. No state, however, prohibits parents from using cor-
poral punishment in the upbringing of their children. The issue is
what is reasonable.62  Eight states have felt that the term non-acciden-
tal physical injury is so ambiguous in regard to corporal punishment
that they have attempted to distinguish corporal punishment from non-
accidental physical injury. Four states specifically permit reasonable
corporal punishment and note that it is not child abuse.63  Four states
reverse the wording and state that excessive corporal punishment is




Neglect, unlike the element of non-accidental physical injury,
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(3) (West
Cum. Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.39 (1977); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.21(C) (Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-117(1) (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03.1(C)
(Page 1976); S.C. CODE § 20-10-20(F) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-113(a)(ii)(B) (1977).
61. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-103(1)(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
62. What is reasonable and what is not, involves a balancing of four factors. One: How old is
the child? Two: What part of the body was struck? Three: What was used to strike the child?
Four: How much damage was inflicted?
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("... reasonable exercise of pa-
rental discipline .. "); OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151-03.1(C) (Page 1976) ("... corporal pun-
ishment or other physical disciplinary means ... not abuse."); OKLa. STAT. tit. 21, § 844 (Supp.
1977) (". . . nothing... shall prohibit. . . using ordinary force as a means of discipline .
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(12) (Supp. 1976) (". . . reasonable parental discipline . .
64. N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) (1976) (" ... excessive corporal punishment ....
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(2)(a) (1977) ("... excessive corporal punishment .... ); S.C. CODE
§ 20-10-20(c)(1) (Supp. 1977) (". . . excessive corporal punishment ...."); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-
113(a)(ii) (1977) (". . . excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment ....").
65. See generally Areen, supra note 11; Gil, Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 N.P.P.A. J. 1 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Nature of Neglect]; Wald, Realistic Standards, supra note 11; Wald,
Standards for Removal supra note 11.
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seems to defy definition.66 Neglect denotes a standard of care or be-
havior. It is the standard of care that a child is entitled to receive, or it
is the standard of care and support that a parent is required to provide.
There is no agreement of a common standard. At best, the result might
be described as chaotic.67
There are two general schools of thought regarding the standard of
neglect. One school believes that a child is entitled to the care and
support that a reasonably prudent parent might provide.68 The other
school believes that the child is only entitled to the care and support
that the community accepts as a minimum.69 For all practical pur-
poses the standard probably lies between these two extremes and fluc-
tuates from community to community.
Since neglect cannot be defined, great emotionalism surrounds it.
Standards must be applied by individuals and the application of a stan-
dard is a subjective process. In cases of child abuse, it is the social
worker7° and the judge who apply the standard.7' The application of
the standard is often criticized as being culturally emasculated with a
middle class orientation. It is. A few states have attempted to address
community values and cultural differences by creating child protection
teams with lay and minority representation in each community.72
Today, forty-seven states include the element of neglect in their
definition of child abuse. 73  All forty-seven have attempted to develop
their own standards.74 As a result, there is little uniformity. Only in
recent years has there been an attempt to develop reasonable standards
for neglect that could be used by all states. 75 The effort and the result
66. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL, at 5 (1971).
67. Cf. In re Stacey, 16 Ill. App. 3d 179, 183, 305 N.E.2d 634, 638 (1973) ("... no fixed
standard for neglect, so each case must be judged on its particular facts .... .
68. Legal Nature of Neglect, supra note 65, at 6.
69. See Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect & Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court,
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (Rosenheim ed. 1962). See also In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d
820 (1955).
70. See YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CHILDREN 141 (1964); Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best
Interests? 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 605 (1973).
71. See Rosenheim, The Child and His Day in Court, CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 161 (New-
man ed. 1967); Wald, Realistic Standards, supra note 11, at 1001.
72. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("When any racial, ethnic,
or linguistic minority constitute a significant portion of the population of the jurisdiction ... a
member of such minority group shall serve as an additional lay member of the child protection
team").
73. Only Wisconsin, Indiana and Maryland do not include the element of neglect in their
definitions of child abuse. See TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION--1977, supra note 20, at 18.
74. See Areen, supra note 11, at 888 n.5.
75. There has been a concerted effort to develop reasonable standards for neglect. The pro-
ject was the joint undertaking of the American Bar Association and the Institute for Judicial




There is a common belief that the terms sexual molestation and
sexual abuse are self-explanatory. They are not. At a minimum both
terms would include sexual intercourse between a child and an adult.
Beyond that the lines of demarcation are not clear. As a factual matter
it is often difficult to distinguish between appropriate displays of affec-
tion or fondling and other possible disturbing behavior.77
Forty-two states include the element of sexual molestation in the
definition of child abuse. Although it could be defined, thirty-four
states fail to do so. 78  Eight states do attempt to provide some gui-
dance.7 9 Seven of these states do so by referring to another provision
in their codes which provide a definition.80 Maryland has defined it in
its reporting statute as "any act or acts involving sexual molestation or
exploitation, including but not limited to incest, rape, a sexual offense
in any degree, sodomy or unnatural or perverted sexual practices on a
child .. ."81
Wald, Standards/or Removal, supra note 11. There seems to be some question as to whether or
not these standards will be accepted by the American Bar Association.
76. See Bourne & Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention"?Ambiguity and
Conflict in the Proposed Standards in Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U. L. REV. 670 (1977).
77. See Wald, Realistic Standards, supra note 11, at 1024. See also Liten, Giflin & Johnson,
Parental Influence in Unusual Sexual Behavior in Children, 25 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 37, 40-41
(1956).
78. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-1(1) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1975); ARtz. REV.
STAT. § 8-531(1) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807(b) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a)
(West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(1)(a)(II) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17-38a(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Cum. Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(1) (1976); GA. CODE § 74-11 l(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1(a) (Supp.
1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (Cum. Supp.
1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-722 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199-011(6) (1977); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3852(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Cum. Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
722-622(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(i) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.110(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1501(3) (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:38(I) (1977); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-
8.21(C) (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-117(1) (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(1) (1977); 11 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2203 (Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(2) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §
55-16-1.5(2) (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.2(4) (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(12) (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-
3 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
79. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(b)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(3) (1977); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-b)(iii)
(McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(A) (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 845
(Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 20-10-20(C)(2) (Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-113 (1977).
80. Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Wyoming.
81. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(b)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Mental Injury/Emotional Abuse
As early as 1958 it was suggested that mental injury should be in-
cluded in any definition of child abuse.82 The same suggestion has
been echoed by various commentators for the last twenty years. 3
There is little doubt that physical trauma or a hostile psychological
environment can cause mental injury.8 4 There is equally little doubt
that the mental injury can be quite severe 5 and the effects can have a
pronounced effect in later years. 6 It cannot, however, be said with
any surety that a hostile or neglectful environment will result in mental
injury. And this has prompted at least one commentator to suggest
that mental injury and possible intervention should be ". . . premised
solely on damage to a child"8" and not on a harmful environment
which might result in psychological damage and mental injury.
Mental injury or emotional abuse is by far the most intangible of
all of the elements that compose the definition of child abuse. As a term
it almost defies definition. Because it is so hard to define and is so
intangible, there is great feeling that, if it is included in a state's defini-
tion of child abuse, it will lead to selective intervention and over-reac-
tion.
88
Nevertheless, thirty-two states have included the element of
mental injury in their definition of child abuse.89 Twenty-two of those
states have made no attempt to define it.°° Since these terms are de-
82. See MULFORD, EMOTIONAL NEGLECT OF CHILDREN 4 (1958).
83. See Burland, Andrews & Headsten, ChildAbuse: The Tree in the Forest, 52 CHILD WEL-
FARE 585, 588 (1973); Cheeney, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, 13
CHILDREN 86, 89 (1966); Elmer, Hazards in Determining Child Abuse, 44 CHILD WELFARE 28
(1965); KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 68 (1971); WALD, PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND EMOTIONAL
NEGLECT (1961).
84. See Fleshbach, The Effects of Violence in Childhood, 2 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCH. 28
(1973); Loomis, Management of Children's Emotional Reactions to Severe Body Damage (Burns), 9
CLINICAL PED. 362 (1970).
85. See MACFARLANE, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE MENTAL HEALTH OF THE
CHILD-PROJECT REPORTS, CHILDHOOD INFLUENCES UPON INTELLIGENCE, PERSONALITY AND
MENTAL HEALTH 131 (1971).
86. See GOLDSTEIN, SOLNIT & FREUD, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 20
(1973); Robertson, Mothering as an Influence on Early Development, 17 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY
CHILD 245 (1962).
87. See Wald, Realistic Standards, supra note 11, at 1017.
88. See DEFRANCIS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS 13 (1968).
89. In some states mental injury is called emotional abuse, in others it is called emotional
neglect, emotional maltreatment or psychological abuse.
90. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-1(1) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-531(1) (1974); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 42-807(b) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a (1978 Special Pamphlet); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1(a) (Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-722 (Cum. Supp.
1977); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.011(6) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.403(B)(3) (West Cum. Supp.
1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3852(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51 A (Cum. Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-21-5(i) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.110(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
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fined and are reportable in other sections of the code, many states feel
no obligation to define mental injury.9' Several states, however, have
attempted to define the term. New Hampshire, for example, defines
mental injury to be "such that said child exhibits symptoms of emo-
tional problems, generally recognized to result from constant mistreat-
ment or neglect ... - Rhode Island is more specific, defining
mental injury as:
a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual func-
tioning in relation to but not limited to such factors as: failure to
thrive, ability to think or reason; control of aggression or self-de-
structive impulses; acting out or misbehavior including incorrigibil-
ity, ungovernability; or habitual truancy; provided, however, that
such injury must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or in-
ability of the parent or other person responsible for the child's wel-
fare to exercise a minimum degree of care for the child.93
Who Must Report
The first generation of reporting statutes singled out the physician
as the mandated reporter.94 Physicians were singled out because it was
felt that they had the necessary training and expertise to identify child
abuse. As a profession, they were mandated to report because it was
felt that they often saw the child abuse case but chose not to report.95
While it was true that some physicians consciously chose not to report,
the majority of physicians did not report for other reasons. Many were
unaware of the clinical aspects of child abuse96 while others were una-
ware of their obligation to report.97 And many, even if they did iden-
tify a case of suspected child abuse, did not know whom to report to. 98
§ 28.1501(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(1) (1977); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.21(c)(1)
(Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2203 (Cum. Supp.
1978); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 15.02(c) (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1.5(1)
(Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2(A)(1) (Supp. 1977).
91. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(16)
(Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:38(l) (1977). See also FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1)(i) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES § 10-1301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
93. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(3) (1977). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(h) (McKinney
1975); S.C. CODE § 20-10-20(G) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-113(a)(ii)(A)(1977).
94. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 110.
95. See Fontana, The Neglect and Abuse of Children, 64 N.Y. STATE J. MED. 215 (1964);
McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as McCoid]; Paulsen, ChildAbuse Reporting Statutes, the Hope ofthe Legislation,
67 CAL. L. REV. 4 (1967).
96. See Berlow, Recognition and Rescue of the Battered Child, 41 HOSPITALS 58 (1967).
97. See Curphey, Noguchi & Moore, The Battered Child Syndrome- Responsibilities ofthe
Pathologist, 102 CAL. MED. 102, 104 (1965); Silver, Barton & Dublin, Child Abuse Laws-Are
They Enough, 199 J.A.M.A. 65, 101 (1967).
98. See Stark, The Battered Child" Does Britain Need a Reporting Statute, PUBLIC LAW 48, 53
(1969).
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During the past two decades the group of professionals mandated
to report has been expanded broadly. 99 A few commentators have dis-
agreed with this trend and have argued that the obligation to report
should rest solely with the medical profession.l°° A critical evaluation
of the dynamics of child abuse, however, strongly supports the conten-
tion that there should be a broad base of mandated reporters. Child
abuse is a pattern of behavior. I0 l The longer the abusive behavior
continues, the more severe the damage to the child. In most cases a
physician only sees the child when the injuries are so severe that they
require immediate medical attention. The physician in these cases has
the opportunity of identifying the severe case of child abuse. A more
prudent approach would seem to dictate a system which identifies the
child before the damage becomes too severe.
0 2
Accordingly, the second and third generation reporting statutes
have substantially broadened the base of mandated reporters. Since
1974, all fifty states have required that physicians report." 3 The inclu-
sion of other professionals in this mandated base has been sweeping.
In 1974, thirty-four states required nurses to report,' °4 twenty-four re-
quired teachers to report, 10 5 twenty-five required social workers to re-
port' 6 and nine states required police officers to report. 0 7  Today,
forty-eight states require nurses to report,10 8 forty-nine require teachers
and school officials to report,'°9 forty-nine require social workers to re-
99. See FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 159 (1973); Gromet, The Plaintive Plain-
tiffs, Victims of the Battered Child Syndrome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296, 305 (1970); Hansen, Doctors, Law-
yers and the Battered Child Law, 5 J. TRAUMA 826, 827 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hansen].
100. See McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults on the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27
(1965); Paulsen, supra note 38, at 113.
101. See Heifer, Diagnostic Process, supra note 17.
102. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 108.
103. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 109; A Review of the Literature, supra note 42,
at 272.
104. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 109 n.24.
105. Id at 109 n.26.
106. Id. at 109 n.25.
107. Id. at 109 n.27.
108. States requiring nurses to report include: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas; Califor-
nia; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa;
Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Mississippi; Missouri;
Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Car-
olina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina;
South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; Wisconsin and Wyo-
ming.
109. States requiring teachers or school personnel to report include: Alabama; Alaska; Ari-
zona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho;
Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michi-
gan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New
Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Penn-
sylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Virginia; Wash-
ington; West Virginia; Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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port1 ° and forty states require law enforcement officers to report."'
Additionally, in 1974 sixteen states required "any person" to report in
addition to the specified professionals." 12 Today twenty states require
"any person" to report.'' 3
The expansion of the base of mandated reporters simply reflects
the reality of the problem. Physicians do not have daily access to
young children. They see the child when immediate medical care is
necessary. Other persons-nurses, teachers, social workers, relatives
and next-door neighbors-do have almost daily access to young chil-
dren. These persons have the unique opportunity of identifying the
child in peril long before the damage becomes severe.
The fact that a particular statute broadly increases the number of
mandated reporters is no guarantee of success. Language like that
contained in the California Penal Code: "physician, surgeon, dentist,
resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, religious practitioner. . . reg-
istered nurse . . . superintendent, any supervisor of child welfare and
attendance, or any certified pupil personnel employee . . . principal
• ..teacher. . . licensed day care worker. . . administrator of a pub-
lic or private summer day camp or child care center. . . social worker
• . . (must report) . ..,, " is not enough. Until those mandated to
report suspected cases of child abuse know that they have an obligation
to report, know what child abuse is, know how to identify it, know to
whom to report, there is little chance that it will be any more successful
than the older more narrowly-drawn statutes. 1 5 A broadened base of
mandated reporters, coupled with an effective public awareness and ed-
110. States requiring social workers to report include: Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas;
California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana;
Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota;
Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico;
New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Is-
land; South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Virginia; West Virginia; Washing-
ton; Wisconsin and Wyoming.
11l. States requiring police officers to report include: Alabama; Alaska; Arkansas; Arizona;
California; Connecticut; Georgia; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana;
Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Ne-
braska; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota;
Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Vir-
ginia; West Virginia and Wyoming.
112. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 109 n.28.
113. States which require "any other person," or "any person" to report include: Alabama;
Delaware; Florida; Idaho; Indiana; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Montana; Nebraska;
New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Utah and
Wyoming.
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
115. See text accompanying notes 226-29, infra.
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ucational campaign will, however, make a substantial difference in re-
porting.
When Must a Report Be Made
It is commonly believed that a mandated reporter must report
when he knows that a child has been abused. The belief is incorrect.
Individuals are mandated to report when they believe or suspect that a
child has been abused. The actual determination of abuse is made by a
caseworker after the child abuse investigation has been completed.
Language which describes the degree of certainty necessary before
a report is made varies from state to state. 1 6 In some states it is "cause
to believe."'117 In other states it is "reasonable cause to suspect" 118 or
"reasonable cause to know or suspect."'' 9 While the language may
vary from state to state, for all practical purposes, the meaning is sub-
stantially the same.' 2°
There are some instances, however, in which the different lan-
guage is very important. Language which includes the word reason-
able-reasonable cause to believe--denotes an objective test for
reporting purposes. It is what reasonable men in similar circumstances
would believe to be the case, whether or not the individual in question
(the reporter) actually formed the belief.'21 The word belief or suspect,
on the other hand, standing alone denotes a subjective test for reporting
purposes. It is a test under which only the reporter is required to hold
the requisite opinion or belief.'22 The distinction between an objective
test and a subjective test is of paramount importance in resolving the
issue of civil liability for a failure to report.'23
The first generation reporting statutes required that a report be
made when there was reason to believe or suspect that a child had been
abused. A number of states have substantially broadened that require-
ment. Today twenty-four states require that a report be made when
there is reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused or the
reporter observed the child being subjected to circumstances or condi-
116. For an excellent discussion of the degree of certainty, or the reporter's state of mind, see A
Review of the Literature, supra note 42, at 276.
117. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1975).
118. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977).
119. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
120. See DEFRANCIS & LuCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's, at 8 (Rev. ed.
1974).
121. See A Review ofthe Literature, supra note 42, at 277.
122. See A Review ofthe Literature, supra note 42, at 277.
123. See generally Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in ChildAbuse Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
753 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
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tions which would reasonably result in abuse.I24 The intent is to pro-
vide a mechanism to identify the child in peril before serious damage is
inflicted.
How, When and to Whom a Report Must Be Made
Every state requires that an oral report of suspected child abuse be
forwarded to the appropriate agency. Almost every state requires that
that report be made immediately orpromptly.125 Forty-two states make
provision for a written report to follow the oral report, usually within
forty-eight to seventy-two hours.1 26 The purpose of the oral report is to
permit the receiving agency to take immediate protective action, if the
child's life or health is in danger. The purpose of the written report is
to provide a foundation for the investigation and a written record of the
report. 127
Historically, three different agencies have served as the repository
for reports of suspected child abuse. Each agency has inherent
strengths and weaknesses. The first generation of reporting statutes
identified the police department as the most appropriate agency to re-
ceive and investigate reports of suspected child abuse. Proponents of
police departments as the receiving agency argue that child abuse in
serious cases is a crime1 28 and that the police are available twenty-four
hours a day and seven days a week.1 29  Furthermore, the proponents
argue that people are accustomed to reporting acts of violence to the
124. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-1(1) (Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (Cum. Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-102(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.011(6) (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Cum. Supp.
1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. § 9.6-8.10(b) (Cum. Supp.
1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e)(ii) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.031(B) (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-11-3 (Supp. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-16-1.5(2) (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.3(1) (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (Cure. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-116(ii)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
125. There are two exceptions. These states simply require that a report be made. There is no
time limit. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 110-118(1)(b) (1978); S.C. CODE § 20-10-50 (Supp. 1977).
126. There are eight states which have no provision for a written report. They are Alaska,
Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota and Tennessee.
127. The contents of these written reports are remarkably similar. They include: the name of
the child suspected of being abused; the child's age and address; the name of the child's parents;
the parents' address; the names and ages of other children in the same home; the nature and the
extent of the injuries and any other information the reporter believes might be important.
128. See Swanson, The Role ofthe Police in the Protection of Children from Abuse and Neglect,
25 FED. PROB. 43, 44 (1961).
129. Id.
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police 30 and that police have the unilateral right to enter a home with-
out court permission if they believe that a child is in imminent dan-
ger.' 3' Opponents, on the other hand, argue that once the parents have
been arrested and charged with a crime, it is very unlikely that they will
cooperate with the Department of Social Services and begin voluntary
treatment. 32 Furthermore, a successful conviction for child abuse in
the criminal court is rare 133 and even if a prosecution is successful, it
only addresses the need for retribution and not the issue of treat-
ment.' 34 Opponents to police departments being the repository of re-
ports of child abuse also argue that child abuse is a very complex
problem and police officers do not have the necessary expertise and
training to deal with it.' 35 Also, the police are viewed as a punitive
agency and this punitive ambience will inhibit abusive parents from
seeking help. 136  Opponents also argue that police are not viewed with
respect by the other agencies and it is unlikely that a police department
would be able to develop a cooperative approach.
37
A few states and a few commentators have suggested that the juve-
nile court is the appropriate agency to receive and investigate reports of
suspected child abuse. They argue that the juvenile court's chief pur-
pose is to protect the child's interests and to provide treatment' 38 and
that when the court reaches a decision on behalf of the child, it has the
power to ensure that the decision will be upheld.' 39  Others, however,
argue that it is inappropriate for the juvenile court to investigate a case
it may later have to hear"4 and that the juvenile court, like the police
department, is often viewed as being a punitive agency. 4 1 Further-
more, the juvenile court is already overcrowded and if another function
130. See COLLINS, The Role of the Law Enforcement Agency, THE BATrERED CHILD 207
(Kempe & Heifer eds. 1968).
131. Id
132. See Daly, Willful Child.Abuse and the Reporting Statute, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283, 325
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Daly]; Reinhart, The Abused Child- Mandatory Reporting Legislation,
188 J.A.M.A. 358 (1964).
133. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 115; Paulsen & Blake, The Abused and Mal-
treated Child- A Review, 7 TRAUMA 52 (1967).
134. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 107.
135. See Hansen, supra note 99, at 828.
136. See Brieland, Protective Services and ChildAbuse, 40 Sbc. SERV. REV. 369, 377 (1966).
137. See Silver, ChildAbuse Laws-Are They Enough? 199 J.A.M.A. 65 (1967); Winking, Cop-
ing with ChildAbuse. One State's Experience, 1968 PUBLIC WELFARE 189, 190.
138. See Boardman, A Project to Rescue Children from Inflicted Injuries, 7 Soc. WORK 43, 49
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Boardman].
139. See Terr & Watson, The Battered Child Rebrutalized, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 126, 132 (1968).
140. See Comment, Indiana's Statutory Protection for the Abused Child, 9 VAL. L. REV. 89, 123
(1974).
141. See Boardman, supra note 138, at 49.
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were added it would be swamped.142
Over the past few years the majority of commentators and the ma-
jority of states have isolated the Department of Social Services as the
most appropriate agency to receive and investigate reports of suspected
child abuse. They argue convincingly that to prevent child abuse from
recurring, it is necessary to provide treatment and the Department of
Social Services is uniquely qualified to provide that treatment. 43 Fur-
thermore, personnel in the Department of Social Services are the best
trained and the best qualified to handle these cases." Also, the local
department is viewed as being non-punitive. They are likely to obtain
the necessary cooperation from parents to make treatment successful.
The Department of Social Services also is the agency most likely to be
able to develop cooperation with other agencies and professionals. 45
The Department of Social Services can provide treatment in addition
to the receipt and the investigation of reports and, in many cases, the
Department is already involved with the parents and the child and can
intervene before serious injury is inflicted.
146
There are critics of the Department of Social Services, 47 but when
all the factors are weighed it is apparent that the Department is the
most appropriate agency to receive and investigate reports of child
abuse. Today, twenty-four states require that reports of suspected
child abuse be made to the Department of Social Services.' 48 Four
states have identified two agencies for receipt of the report, but ensure
142. See Paulsen, supra note 38, at 47.
143. See D. BESHAROV, THE EPILOGUE IN FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 255
(1973); DEFRANCIS, THE STATUS OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, HELPING THE BATTERED
CHILD AND HiS FAMILY 140 (1972).
144. See Awana, An Interdiscplinary Child Protective Services Unit, SECOND NATIONAL SYM-
POSIUM ON CHILD ABUSE (1973).
145. See Note, Ohio's Mandatory Reporting Statute for Cases of Child Abuse, 18 W. RES. L.
REV. 1405 (1967).
146. See HAEL, PROTECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES-ARE THEY SYNONOMOUS (1969); .4
Review of the Literature, supra note 42, at 289.
147. See Campbell, The Neglected Chiid- His and His Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts
Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 631, 643
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Campbell]; Fischer, Is Casework Effective? .4 Review, 1973 Soc.
WORK 1, 5 [hereinafter cited as Fischer]; See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322 n. 11
(1971).
148. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38c (Cum. Supp.
1977); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 904 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.01(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1618 (Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE § 235A.4(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.335(3) (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3854(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 722.623.2(d)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.110(3) (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:41 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
415 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1.02(3) (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 846(A) (West Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. §
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that all reports ultimately flow into the Department of Social Serv-
ices.'49 Finally, one state has identified three agencies 50 and one state,
four agencies' 5 ' as possible repositories for reports, but again ensure
that all reports flow to the Department of Social Services for ultimate
disposition.
Unless one state agency is provided with ultimate responsibility to
oversee reports of suspected child abuse there is confusion, fragmenta-
tion and inefficiency. Today, twelve states permit reporting to two sep-
arate agencies152 and eight states permit reporting to three separate
agencies with no provision for coordination or ultimate responsibil-
ity.' 53  The result, as expected, is chaotic.' 54
Immunity
Individuals who are mandated to report suspected child abuse
often fear that if their report proves to be erroneous they will be
sued.'55 In an effort to encourage reporting, every state provides im-
munity from criminal and civil liability if the report is made in good
faith.' 56 In an effort to give an impression of even more protection,
2206 (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
149. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(A) (Supp. 1976); ILL. REV STAT. ch. 23, § 2057 (1977); KAN.
STAT. § 38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
150. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-1(4) (1975).
151. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
152. GA. CODE § 74-111(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2 (Supp. 1976); IND.
CODE § 12-3-4.1-2 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1503 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J.
STAT. § 9:6-8.10 (Cum. Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.755 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 20-10-
50(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-1168 (1977).
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 161.5(a) (West Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(D)(1)
(West Cum. Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
13-14-14.1 (Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 34.02 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977); Wis.
STAT. § 48.981 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
154. See Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy. Practice in a Unique Court, 1974 PRAc. L. INST.
131.
155. Possible liability might include libel, slander, defamation of character, invasion of privacy
and breach of confidence. See McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family,
50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1965).
156. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-9 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47:17:050 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (Supp. 1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-814 (Cum. Supp. 1976); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-10-107 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38c (Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL.
CODE tit. 16, § 905 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(10) (Cum. Supp. 1976); GA. CODE §
74-111(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-3 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620
(Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2059 (1977); IND. CODE § 12-34.1-4 (Cum. Supp.
1976); IOWA CODE § 235A.7 (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 38-718 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 199.335(6) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(E) (West Cum. Supp. 1976); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3856 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(h)(l) (Cum. Supp.
1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.625(1)
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fifteen states presume the good faith of the reporter. 5 7
For all practical purposes the inclusion of an immunity provision
in a reporting statute is cosmetic. To successfully sue a person who
made a child abuse report, the plaintiff would have to show that the
reporter acted with a malicious purpose. To successfully block a suit
such as this, it would only be necessary to show that the reporter re-
ported in good faith. 58 Although immunity provisions are cosmetic,
they do have value. They are reassuring to that group of individuals
who must report, who are afraid to report and who do not know how
the legal system functions.
The Abrogation of Privileged Communications
It is often quite difficult to establish child abuse in the juvenile
court. It is even more difficult to establish culpability in the criminal
court.'59 To offset some of the problems which are inherent in the
child abuse case, most states abrogate the status of one or more types of
privileged communications 6° in a child abuse case. When the status of
a privileged communication is abrogated, the result permits a man-
dated reporter to report as required by law, cooperate with the Depart-
ment of Social Services in the child abuse investigation and give
evidence in a judicial proceeding.
Seventeen states abrogate the status of privileged communications
between husband and wife and doctor and patient.' 61 Twenty states
(Cum. Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.135 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES § 10-1306
(Cum. Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1507 (Cum. Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.505
(Cum. Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.42 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-
8.13 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.2(B) (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
419 (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50-25.1-09 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 847 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.762 (Supp. 1976); I1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2211
(Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-4 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 20-10-90 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-14 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1209 (Cum. Supp.
1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.03 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-
16-4 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.5
(Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.061(l) (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-6 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-120 (1977).
157. These states are: Arkansas; Colorado; Florida; Illinois; Maine (rebuttable presumption);
Michigan; Mississippi; Montana; New Mexico; New York; North Dakota; Pennslyvania; South
Carolina (rebuttable presumption); Tennessee and Wyoming.
158. See Shepard, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Shepard]; Paulsen, supra note 38, at 24.
159. See Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 4, at 117.
160. The most common types of privileged communication are those between husband-wife,
doctor-patient, social worker-client, priest-penitent.
161. There is some question as to whether there is really a need to abrogate the status of privi-
leged communication between doctor and patient in cases of child abuse. See Note, Extrajudicial
Truthful Disclosure of Medical Confidences: 4 Physician's Civil Liability, 44 DEN. L.J. 463 (1967).
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abrogate the status of all privileged communications except that of at-
torney and client. 162  Five states abrogate the status of all privileged
communications in cases of child abuse. 1
63
Penalty Provisions for a Failure to Report
A number of states now provide in their reporting statute a specific
penalty for a failure to report suspected cases of child abuse. Penalty
provisions, like immunity provisions, were drafted with the specific in-
tent of encouraging reports. Immunity provisions were drafted to reas-
sure hesitant reporters that they would not be held liable if they made a
good faith report. Penalty provisions, on the other hand, were drafted
to ensure hesitant reporters that they would be held liable if they chose
not to report.
The purpose of the reporting statute, of course, is to identify the
child in peril. It is argued that if a report is made, and if the child truly
is in danger, the protective mechanisms of the state will be triggered.
The person who consciously fails to report, short-circuits the system
and prevents the protective mechanism from being triggered. In effect,
the person who chooses not to report, personally assures the child's fu-
ture safety.
Thirty-four states now include in their reporting statutes a crimi-
nal penalty for a failure to report."6 The penalty in almost all of the
The following statutes, however, do abrogate the status of privileged communications be-
tween husband and wife, and physician and patient. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (Cum. Supp.
1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-112 (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-5 (Supp. 1976);
IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE § 235A.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MINN.
STAT. § 626.556(8) (Cum. Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1505 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 110-121 (Cum. Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.775 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS § 26-10-15 (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.11 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.44.060(1) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. § 905.04 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (doctor-patient) and Wis. STAT.
§ 905.05(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (husband-wife).
162. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-10 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1976); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-815 (Cum. Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 907 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT.
§ 827.07(11) (Cum. Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §
199.335(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F) (West Cum. Supp. 1976); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3856(A) (Cum. Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.631 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.140 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1312(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
169:43 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2222(2) (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE § 20-10-100 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1210 (Cum. Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §
34.04 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-
121 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2060 (1977); K.AN. STAT. § 38-719 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1307 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.2(A) (Supp. 1976);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 848 (Supp. 1977).
164. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-13 (Supp. 1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(A) (Supp.
1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(4)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(b)
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states is designated as a misdemeanor. It provides for a short jail sen-
tence or fine or both upon conviction. The requirement of proving a
willful failure to report beyond a reasonable doubt makes the likeli-
hood of a successful prosecution very unlikely. '
65
Commentators have split evenly on the utility and value of a pen-
alty provision in the reporting statute. Some feel that the provisions
are deleterious and unenforceable.166 Others believe that they are nec-
essary and prudent.1 67  While both arguments have some merit, there
is very little doubt that the emergence of civil liability 61 for a failure to
report has had and will continue to have a substantial impact on the
reporting of child abuse.
In 1967, it was suggested that a physician who failed to report a
suspected case of child abuse could be held civilly liable for subsequent
injuries to the same child. 16 9 The same theme was echoed a number of
times over the next decade.' 7°  The cause of action most often men-
tioned as a possibility was based on the doctrine of negligence per se.
Negligence per se is possible if there is a criminal statute in existence in
the state with a criminal provision attached, if the person harmed was a
(Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 909 (Cum. Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 827.07 (14)(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); GA. CODE § 74-11 l(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IND. CODE § 12-34.1-2(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE § 235A.9(l) (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. § 38-720 (Cum. Supp.
1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.990(7) (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-403(I) (West Cum. Supp.
1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3857 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT: § 626.556(6) (Cum. Supp.
1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.165 (Cum. Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1508 (Supp. 1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.507 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:45 (Cum. Supp.
1976); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.14 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1(c) (Supp. 1976);
N.Y. SOc. SERV. LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-13 (Supp. 1977);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.990(6) (Supp. 1976); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2212 (Supp. 1977); S.C.
CODE § 20-10-190 (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10- 10 (Supp. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1211 (Cum. Supp. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.07(Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-6 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3(B) (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.080 (Supp. 1976);
W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
165. In a criminal action it is necessary to establish a criminal act (actus reus) and a criminal
intent (mens reus). In a criminal action for a failure to report, the element of intent is extremely
difficult to establish. See Bonfield, The Abrogaion of Penal Sanctions by Nonenforcement, 49
IOWA L. REV. 389 (1974).
166. See Brieland, Protective Services and Child Abuse, 40 Soc. SERV. REV. 369, 375 (1966);
Shepard, supra note 158, at 192.
167. See Daly, supra note 132, at 336; Hansen, Doctors, Lawyers and the Battered Child, 51 J.
TRAUMA 826, 828 (1965); McCoid, supra note 95, at 43.
168. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-
104(4)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE § 235A.9(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
722.633(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. SOc. SERV. LAW § 420(2) (McKinney 1976).
169. See Paulsen, supra note 38, at 34.
170. See Bard, Connecticut's ChildAbuse Law, 48 CONN. BAR J. 260, 269 (1974); Pragmatic
Alternative, supra note 4, at 115; Isaacson, Holding Physicians Civilly Liablefor a Failure to Report,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743 (1975).
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member of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and
if the harm suffered was a harm the statute was enacted to prevent.
Theories have a nasty habit of becoming reality. In 1970, the first
civil action for a failure to report was filed.' 7 ' Although the case was
settled out of court, it did serve notice to the medical community that
civil liability was indeed a reality.
Six years later another civil suit was filed. This case was success-
ful. The court in Landeros v. Flood'7 2 ruled that a physician who
failed to report a suspected case of child abuse could be held civilly
liable for subsequent damages to the same child. The case was argued
successfully on the basis of medical malpractice. Today, it has been
suggested that civil liability for a failure to report could be successfully
argued on three separate theories: medical malpractice; statutory negli-
gence; or liability per se.
The possibility of civil liability for a failure to report coupled with
an expanded reporting statute raises a number of interesting issues and
possibilities. In the past, discussion of civil liability for a failure to
report has centered around physicians. There is little doubt, however,
that other professionals who are mandated to report-nurses, teachers,
social workers-and who do not do so could also be held civilly liable.
In the past, language which described the degree of certainty required
before reporting-reason to believe, reasonable cause to suspect-was
regarded as meaning substantially the same thing.'7 3 The different
language, however, gives rise to different types of tests (objective and
subjective) and the issue of whether or not a report should have been
made becomes the pivotal issue in questions of civil liability. Previ-
ously, definitions of child abuse have been drafted in a rather cavalier
manner. But now, since a failure to report child abuse can result in
civil liability, the definitions of child abuse take on a new significance.
Reporters are caught in the awkward position of having to report child
abuse but finding that some of the elements of child abuse seem to defy
definition, ite., neglect and mental injury. In any event, five states
have adopted a penalty provision which provides for the possibility of
civil liability for a failure to report.
174
171. Robison v. Wical, No. 70-37607 (Cal. Super. Ct.; San Luis Obispo, filed September 4,
1970). For a discussion of the case see Ramsey & Lawler, The Battered Child Syndrome, 1 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 372 (1974).
172. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 551 P.2d 389 (1976). For a discussion of the case see
Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 118 (1974).
173. For an excellent article dealing with civil liability see Comment, Civil Liabilityfor Failing
to Report Child Abuse, I DET. L. REV. 135 (1977); Brown, supra note 123.
174. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(4)(b)
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Broadening the Impact and the Scope: The Investigation
Over the past few years, reporting statutes have begun to address
issues beyond the process of identification. In a number of states there
has been a realistic recognition that identification by itself is virtually
useless. As a result, some reporting statutes have become more com-
prehensive. Some states have begun to show concern for issues that




Every state has identified at least one statewide agency to receive
and investigate reports of suspected child abuse. These agencies have
been criticized for hiring untrained staff, for not providing in-service
training, for keeping poor records, for keeping too many records, for
having too few minority workers, for intervening too late, for interven-
ing capriciously, for failing to provide coordination, for failing to
budget properly and for not creating adequate treatment programs.
176
Nowhere has criticism been more severe or more focused than on the
agency's investigation of the report of suspected child abuse.
The first generation reporting statutes were rather simplistic in
their approach to the investigation. They simply required that an in-
vestigation be made when a report was received. No guidelines were
provided for the when, the what and the how. Predictably, results
were tenuous at best. Today, only a few states have retained such sim-
plistic language. Indiana, for example, states that:
upon receipt of a report ... the law enforcement agency or county
department of public welfare receiving such report shall immediately
cause an investigation into the facts contained therein and, upon
completion, if the facts so warrant shall submit a written report to the
prosecutor in the county where the injury or injuries were
inflicted. 
177
The majority of states have recognized that piecemeal, fragmented
and tardy investigations do not provide enough data to make prudent
decisions. The trend in recent years has been to develop specific
guidelines for the child abuse investigation. Arkansas,"'8 for example,
requires the investigating agency to determine the nature, the extent
(Cum. Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE § 235A.9(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.633(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 420(2) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
175. As the scope of the reporting statute has broadened, the name has changed. Today these
statutes are called Child Abuse Acts, Child Protection Acts, or Protective Service Acts.
176. See generally Fischer, supra note 147; Campbell, supra note 147.
177. IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
178. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-813 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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and the cause of child abuse, the identity of the person(s) responsible
for the abuse, the names and conditions of other children in the same
home, the condition of the home environment, the condition (by an
evaluation) of the persons responsible for the child and the type (quali-
ty) of relationships that the child has with his parents and other persons
responsible for his care.
To accomplish these objectives, the investigating agency is re-
quired to make a visit to the child's home and permitted to make a
physical, psychological or psychiatric examination of the child in ques-
tion. Other states have provided for an even more comprehensive and
timely child abuse investigation.
Legislative provisions such as these presume that a good child
abuse investigation can be mandated. The presumption is not true.
The availability of trained staff in adequate numbers with sufficient re-
sources is a condition precedent to mandating any type of comprehen-
sive investigation. In most jurisdictions, it is lacking.
Psychological/Psychiatric Examination of the Parents
A psychological or a psychiatric examination of the child's parents
coupled with a social history can be quite valuable in helping to deter-
mine the probability of culpability' and the best dispositional alterna-
tive.'8 ° Such examinations have been used rather routinely by juvenile
courts. In most cases, however, they have been used after the issue of
abuse has been resolved but before the issues of custody and treatment
have been decided.""' In these cases the results of the examination are
used to help determine the most appropriate disposition. Since the is-
sue of abuse has already been resolved, it cannot be argued that the
examination is being used as a fishing license to establish culpability.
Nevertheless, a number of courts now provide for a psychological
or psychiatric examination of the parents before the issue of abuse is
resolved. Seven states have now drafted provisions into their reporting
statute which encourage and permit such examinations before the adju-
179. A psychiatric evaluation in this sense is really a determination of whether or not the par-
ent has a high potential for abuse. A high potential for abuse coupled with unexplained injuries
could be regarded as circumstantial evidence to show culpability. A number of predictive ques-
tionnaires or parenting profiles have been developed and are quite accurate. See HELFER, The
Predictive Questionnaire, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND His FAMILY 271 app. A (1974).
180. The psychiatric evaluation in this sense is used to determine the feasability of offering
certain kinds of treatment. In certain cases it indicates that treatment per se would be futile and
another disposition must be sought, ie., termination of parental rights.
181. In juvenile court to resolve the issue of child abuse there are two separate hearings. The
first is the adjudication. At the adjudication, there is only one issue to resolve: Has the child been
abused? The second hearing is the disposition. At the disposition hearing there are only two
issues to resolve: What treatment should be offered and who will have custody of the child?
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dicatory hearing.'82 Provisions such as these are subject to criticism.
The criticism that is most often leveled against such provisions is
that a forced examination before a finding of abuse has been made is
tantamount to forcing the parent to testify against him or herself. Pro-
ponents of such provisions argue, however, that the juvenile court is
not a criminal court. 183 The purpose of such proceedings, they argue, is
to determine if the child has been abused, not who abused him and to
determine what treatment ought to be offered to protect the child's
safety and interests. The parent is not forced to testify against his in-
terests because his interests are not in question and not in jeopardy.
While the argument may be technically correct, the actual result can be
somewhat different.
Medical Examination of the Child
Contrary to popular belief, child abuse is not an easy condition to
diagnose." 4  This is particularly true in cases of neglect18 5 and mental
injury, but can also be true in cases of non-accidental physical injury.
In a case of non-accidental physical injury, the actual injury is
quite easy to identify. The difficult issue is whether it was non-acci-
dental. To determine if an injury was non-accidental often requires a
careful analysis of the child's injuries in relation to the parents' expla-
nation (is it reasonable) of how or when the injury occurred. This type
of examination and analysis requires specific medical expertise. It is
an expertise that the vast majority of caseworkers investigating a case
of suspected child abuse do not have.
A good child abuse investigation includes a complete physical ex-
amination of the child by a qualified and licensed physician. Since
children's injuries mend with remarkable speed, it is imperative that
the examination be made quickly. Each injury should be examined
individually and characterized according to its type, extent, severity
and age.' 8 6  The results of such a medical examination should be en-
182. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(f)(i) (Cum.
Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(G)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 34.05 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.14 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.44.080(2) (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
183. While it is true that the juvenile court is civil in nature, many would argue that the court's
authority to separate the parent from the child (temporarily or permanently) gives the court a
punitive dimension. The penalty involved is a loss of the child.
184. Reporters are asked to report their suspicions or their beliefs. They are not asked to make
a final determination of abuse. There is a great difference between a suspicion and the diagnosis.
185. See Sgroi, supra note 9, at 18.
186. See Fraser, Independent Representationfor the Abused and Neglected Child- The Guardian
Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 16, 37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Independent Representation.
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tered into the child's official medical records immediately. 187
Five states have recognized the limitations of individual
caseworkers and the value of medical expertise. These states provide
in their reporting statute for the medical examination of a child sus-
pected of being abused, regardless of whether the parents agree.
88
Color Photographs and X-Rays
In order to facilitate the investigation and to preserve evidence, a
number of states now make provision for the taking of color photo-
graphs and X-rays in cases of child abuse. X-rays are used as a diag-
nostic tool and a means of preserving evidence. Color photographs, on
the other hand, have little diagnostic value. They are used to preserve
a pictorial explanation of the suspected trauma. In the vernacular, a
picture is worth a thousand words.
X-rays are taken when they are ordered by a physician. They are
always taken by a qualified and usually licensed technician. If proper
medical procedures are followed, there is little problem in introducing
them as evidence.' 89  The same is not true, however, of color photo-
graphs. Color photographs are usually not taken by qualified techni-
cians but are taken by social workers, nurses, teachers, physicians and
police officers.' 9° While these photographs can be submitted as evi-
dence,' 91 the shortcomings of the photographer often limit the picture's
probative value. A color photograph is not always an accurate portrait
of the suspected injuries. Issues such as the type of film used, the shut-
ter speed, the type of lighting and perspective in relation to the picture
can be troublesome. 192 A picture is worth a thousand words, but the
picture must be accurate and the photographer must be prepared to tell
187. See Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and LegalAspects ofthe Battered Child Syndrome,
50 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Medical and LegalAspects].
188. MD. CODE ANN. § 35A(h)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.626(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.31(E) (Cum. Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2209(a)
(Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-6(3) (Supp. 1976).
189. See Medical and LegalAspects, supra note 187, at 74.
190. Iowa, for example, permits physicians, dentists, nurses, social workers and psychologists
(among others) to take color photographs. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A. II (Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
191. The usual rule of thumb for color photographs is that they will be admitted into evidence
if they are relevant and material to issues of fact and are not so gruesome as to be inflamatory.
See Albritton v. State, 221 So. 2d 192 (Fla. App. 1969).
However, even if a picture were gruesome or inflammatory, it might be admitted into evi-
dence if it would throw light on a vital issue of the case and resolve a conflict in evidence. See
221 So.2d at 197.
The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that color slides of a dead baby showing numerous
bruises were admissable. See People v. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d 411, 228 N.E.2d 495 (1969).
192. See Ford, Sinister & Glass, Photography ofSuspected ChildAbuse and Maltreatment, BI-
OMEDICAL CoM. July 1975, at 12.
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why the picture is accurate.' 93
Today, fourteen states permit the taking of color photographs and
X-rays in cases of suspected child abuse with or without the parents'
consent. 194 Another four states mandate that such color photographs
and X-rays be taken. 95
A Statewide Central Registry
96
A central registry is a repository for reports of suspected child
abuse. Reports in central registries are listed alphabetically and chron-
ologically. Central registries were originally conceived to provide ac-
curate statistics and help determine the proper diagnosis.
Because child abuse is a pattern of behavior, it is not easy to diag-
nose. It is not unusual for parents to switch doctors and hospitals as
injuries progress.' Unless the physician (or the social worker, nurse
or court) has some indication of the other injuries, only a one-dimen-
sional picture of the child will emerge. If access to a repository of re-
ports of suspected child abuse were available, it is possible that a
pattern would be discernable. The central registry is that repository of
reports and it is used by the physician to help determine the proper
diagnosis. 1
98
A central registry which is properly conceived and properly struc-
tured can provide four functions: (1) it can provide statistics on a
monthly or a yearly basis; (2) it can provide raw data for research pur-
poses; (3) it can be used as a diagnostic tool; and (4) it can be used to
measure the effectiveness of an agency mandated to receive and investi-
gate reports of suspected child abuse.
If a central registry is to be effective, it must contain reports of
suspected child abuse as well as adjudicated cases of child abuse.
193. Id. at 14.
194. ARtz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(c) (Supp. 1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-810 (Cum. Supp.
1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(c) (Cum. Supp.
1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2056 (1977); IOWA CODE § 235A. I1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 722.626(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp.
1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.764 (Supp. 1976) (photographs only); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2207 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.13 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.050 (Supp.
1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-117(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
195. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.120 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.31(G) (Cum. Supp.
1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 416 (McKinney 1976); S.C. CODE § 20-10-70 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
196. For a complete discussion of central registries see Fraser, Toward a More Practical
Central Registry, 51 DEN. L.J. 509 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A More Practical Central Registry].
See also Besharov, Putting Central Registers to Work." Using Modern Management Information
Systems to Improve Child Protective Services, 54 CHI-KENT L. REV. 687 (1978).
197. In re Frances, 49 Misc. 2d 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Fain. Ct. 1966).
198. Some have argued, however, that there is a danger that the reporter might give too much
weight to the previous report. See Daly, supra note 132, at 333.
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While it is necessary to retain reports of suspected child abuse, it is also
important to weed out the malicious bad faith reports and the un-
founded reports. The difficulty lies in determining the line of demar-
cation between founded and unfounded reports. Some states have
attempted to draw this line of demarcation by defining the term "un-
founded." Colorado, for example, defines an unfounded report to
mean ". . . any report . . . which is not supported by some credible
evidence."' 99 The problem, of course, is that credible evidence is not
defined. Putting aside definitional problems, a majority of states list
all reports in the central registry except those that do not meet the cred-
ible evidence test. The majority of reports in a central registry are re-
ports which are supported by some credible evidence, but which do not
have enough evidence to support an adjudication. In effect, the central
registry contains a list of suspected parties, who are listed without
notification, without representation and without a formal hearing. The
fact that some central registries are housed in computers magnifies the
possibility of unauthorized access and unauthorized disclosure of such
names.
The issue pertaining to central registries is relatively straightfor-
ward: does the demonstrated value of a central registry for the purpose
of statistics, research, diagnosis and quality control outweigh the possi-
bility of unauthorized access and disclosure? The answer is yes, but
with a caveat. Legislation creating central registries must be drafted in
such a way as to minimize the possibility of such abuses.
2°
A number of states have attempted to do exactly that. These states
require an extensive investigation with a follow-up report to the central
registry. The follow-up report is used to identify malicious reports and
weed out unfounded reports. These states have narrowly defined who
may have access to the records20 1 contained in the central registry and
under what conditions. They also provide a criminal provision for un-
authorized disclosure, a process for notification of the listed party,2"2 a
process for appeal, expungement and the sealing of records.
The first generation of reporting statutes made no provision for the
creation of central registries. In 1964, only four states had functional
199. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(11) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
200. See A More Practical Central Registry, supra note 196, at 515-16.
201. "Narrowly defined" can, however, be very subjective. New York permits disclosure to a
physician examining the child, a person authorized to assume protective custody, duly authorized
agency personnel, a court, a grand jury, and persons doing bona fide research. N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 422(4)(a)-(h) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
202. States which permit the subject of the report (person suspected of abusing the child) to
review the report's contents usually allow the state department of social services to remove the
name of the person making the report.
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central registries.2 °3 Today, forty states have created central registries
by statute,2' while another six have created central registries by ad-
ministrative fiat.20 5
Temporary Protective Custody
A recent innovation in the reporting statute is the provision for
emergency removal or temporary custody of the child. The first gener-
ation of reporting statutes made no provision for temporary custody. In
1974, only six states made such a provision. 20 6  Today, twenty-eight
states provide for temporary custody or emergency removal. 20 7  The
provisions list who may assume custody, when, and under what cir-
cumstances.
203. See A Review of the Literature, supra note 42, at 300.
204. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-8 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47:17:040 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 8-546.03 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818 (Cum. Supp. 1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11110 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(g) (Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 905(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976);
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7) (Cum. Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1623(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061 (Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE §
235A.14 (Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-721 (Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:403(H)
(West Cum. Supp. 1976); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 5 IF (Cum. Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.627 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 43-24-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1305 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEa. REV. STAT. § 28-1504(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.100 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.44
(1978); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-122 (Cum. Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.421 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 846(A) (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.765 (Supp.
1976); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2214(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-7 (1977);
S.C. CODE § 20-10-130(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12.2 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.06 (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.7(I) (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.070 (Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-124 (1977).
205. The following states have created central registries by administrative fiat: Georgia, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Minnesota, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See also ,4 More Practical Central Registry,
supra note 196, at 5.
206. See A Review of the Literature, supra note 42, at 291.
207. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.142 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. § 8-546.Oc(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-811 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-107 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38(a)(d) (Cum. Supp.
1977); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 16-1612 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-721 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 199.335(4) (1977); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35A(f)-(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51(3) (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.626(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.125 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1309 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.16 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-20(b) (1976);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(d) (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-07 (Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2208 (Cum. Supp. 1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-10-80 (Cum. Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1204 (1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.056 (Supp.
1976); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-119 (1977).
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There is no clear reason for the popularity of these provisions.
Ostensibly, there are three separate purposes: (1) There is often a need
to remove a child from his home before serious damage is inflicted. (2)
There is often a need to keep a child in a hospital under the guardian-
ship of a designated agency because there is a strong possibility that the
child would be reinjured if returned home. (3) The child is in need of
additional medical care, but there is a fear that the parents will not
return with the child for the needed care and it will be impossible to
locate them.
Consequently, authority to remove a child or to keep a child in
protective custody is given to three groups of people: those who must
decide if it is necessary to remove the child from the home; those who
must decide if the custody of the child should be retained by the hospi-
tal or other institution; and those who must decide if additional neces-
sary medical care is required for the child. Every state which permits
emergency removal or temporary custody limits that authority to one
or more of the following groups: social workers, police officers, officers
of the court, physicians and hospital administrators.
Conditions or circumstances which would justify such removal or
custody are rather broad. Colorado, for example, permits removal or
custody if there "is an imminent danger to the child's life or health.
'2°8
Michigan permits temporary custody if a return to the child's home
"would endanger his health or welfare. ' ' 2°  While it may be argued
that an imminent danger to a child's life is a narrow standard for inter-
vention, the same cannot be said for an endangerment of the child's
health or welfare. To provide some balance and safeguards, most
states require that the parents be notified immediately and that there be
a formal hearing within some fixed period of time.
The Child Protection Team2
10
When the investigation has been completed, there are three issues
which must be resolved: (1) Has the child been abused (diagnosis). (2)
What are the chances of treatment being successful (prognosis). (3)
What treatment is available and should be offered to the child and his
family. These are complex issues to resolve and in most cases they are
not resolved properly.
Child abuse is an eclectic problem. To understand its etiology, it
is necessary to have a working knowledge of medical pathology, psy-
208. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-107 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
209. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.626(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
210. See generally SCHMIrr, THE CHILD PROTECTION TEAM HANDBOOK (Garland 1978).
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chiatry, social work and the law. To correctly resolve the issues of
diagnosis, prognosis and treatment in cases of child abuse, it is neces-
sary to have more than a working knowledge. It is necessary to have
expertise. It is unrealistic to expect any one individual to have sub-
stantive expertise in all of these areas. In almost all states and state
delivery systems, however, there is a presumption that there is one indi-
vidual who has all of this expertise. In most states it is an individual
social worker who must resolve the issues of diagnosis, prognosis and
treatment once the investigation has been completed.
An obvious answer to this shortcoming would seem to be the crea-
tion of a pool of expertise. These pools of expertise are called multi-
disciplinary childprotection teams. A number of states have recognized
the shortcomings of requiring one individual-the social worker-to
practice medicine, psychiatry and the law without a license. These
states have created a child protection team by statute.
Those states which have studied the concept of a team approach,
have debated various alternatives and have created such teams by stat-
ute, have developed three different models. The first is the creation of
an advisory team at the community or state level. The advisory team
is a passive participant in the resolution of a child abuse case. The
agency worker who is ultimately responsible for the case is given the
option of utilizing the team's expertise. The decision to use the team is
a discretionary one; the team has no inherent decision-making powers.
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina have developed such teams."'
The second type of team is one organized on a county level, with
fixed responsibilities. The team reviews each case of suspected child
abuse and has some decision-making powers. This second type of
team, unlike an advisory team, is an active participant in the resolution
of child abuse cases. In Colorado, for example, the child protection
team is: (a) specifically defined;2 12 (b) created by law in every county
which receives fifty or more reports of child abuse in one year;213 (c)
211. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 119, § 51D (Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.629(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 210.145(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2216(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978);
S.C. CODE § 20-10-120 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
212. Colorado has a rather innovative definition for the team. Since neglect is an element of
the definition of abuse, and since neglect is really a reflection of community Standards, the Colo-
rado definition permits representatives of the community (minorities and lay persons) to serve on
the team. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
213. The condition precedent to the creation of the team is fifty reported cases, not fifty
founded cases, not fifty adjudicated cases. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(6)(a) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
REPORTING STATUTES
required to review each report of suspected child abuse within one
week of its receipt;2" 4 (d) mandated to make recommendations to the
local department of social services and the central registry;215 (e) per-
mitted to file a petition in the juvenile court on behalf of the abused
child if it so desires;2 6 and (f) required to contact the Guardian Ad
Litum in writing if a petition is filed. The written notification must
include the team's reasons for initiating the petition, suggestions for
optimum disposition and suggested treatment. 7  The states of Ten-
nessee and Wyoming have adopted a model which is closely akin to
Colorado's.
21 1
The third type of team is one on a regional level, with fixed re-
sponsibilities which include the receipt and the investigation of reports
of suspected child abuse, the review of each case on a regular basis and
ultimate decision-making power. Unlike the Colorado model, this
third type of team does not share responsibilities. It is, in effect, not an
active participant in the process, but the process itself. Only one state,
Virginia, has evolved to this point. In Virginia, the child protection
team is: (a) specifically defined;219 (b) created by law in each region of
the state;220 (c) responsible for receiving and investigating all reports of
suspected child abuse;221 (d) responsible for thoroughly reviewing each
case;222 (e) responsible for arranging protective services;223 (f) responsi-
ble, if necessary, for petitioning the juvenile court; 224 and (g) responsi-
ble for providing education about child abuse to the general public.
225
It is not unreasonable to expect some of the states in the second cate-
gory to develop a system like Virginia's.
Education and Training
There is very little value in fine tuning the identification and the
investigatory processes unless individuals are aware of what the law
requires and how the system works. Most individuals are not.
It is rather easy to amend the reporting statute to broaden the base
of mandated reporters, facilitate the reporting process, provide immu-
214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
215. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(9) (CuM. Supp. 1977).
216. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(10) (CuM. Supp. 1977).
217. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(10) (CuM. Supp. 1977).
218. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-123 (1977).
219. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
220. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
221. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
222. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(D) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
223. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(D)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
224. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(D)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
225. VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(E) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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nity for good faith reports and liability for no reports. But unless the
mandated reporters know that there is an obligation to report, know
what child abuse is, know how to identify it and how to report it, there
is little chance that the number of reports will increase or become more
accurate.226 It is easy to draft new and concise standards for the inves-
tigation of child abuse and to provide for color photographs and X-rays
to be used with psychiatric evaluations, but unless the person who is
making the investigation is well-trained and aware of his options, there
is little chance that the quality of the investigation will improve.227
Individual states were slow to grasp the need for education and
training. Today, eleven states specifically provide for education and
training-education for the general public and training for those who
must function in the system.228 Unfortunately, in most states the
agency that is mandated to provide the education and training is the
same agency mandated to receive and investigate reports of suspected
child abuse. This agency is the agency most likely to be undertrained,
understaffed, and overcommitted. Under such circumstances there is
some doubt about how successful such a campaign might be.229
Tinkering with the Most Complex Component.- The Intervention
When the investigation has been completed and the issues of diag-
nosis, prognosis and treatment resolved, it is necessary to implement
the treatment plan. At this stage there can be additional problems. If
involuntary intervention (the court) is necessary, the case is difficult to
prove. And if voluntary or involuntary intervention is necessary, it is
often discovered that treatment services do not exist or are insufficient.
The problems which surround the issue of intervention are the
most complex to resolve. As a result, little is attempted and little is
accomplished. What states have attempted to do falls into three cate-
gories: (1) Making the case easier to prove. (2) Ensuring that the
226. In a poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in 1965, eighty per cent of
the persons interviewed had some knowledge of the problem of child abuse, but less than fifty per
cent knew of child protective services in their community. See Gil & Noble, Public Knowledge,
Attitudes and Opinions About Physical Child Abuse in America, 48 CHILD WELFARE 395, 397
(1969).
227. DAVOREN, THE BATrERED CHILD IN CALIFORNIA 13 (1973).
228. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18950 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(13)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE § 235A.10 (Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-721 (Cum. Supp.
1978); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 722.629(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.155(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 421 (McKinney 1976); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2213
(Cum. Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 20-10-150 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.7(D) (Supp.
1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
229. Iowa is more realistic than the other states. Education and training are required but
within the limits of available funds. IOWA CODE § 235A. 10 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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child's interests are fully protected. (3) Getting better mileage out of
what is available.
Making the Case Easier to Prove: The Prima Facie Case
Child abuse is difficult to prove230 because it usually takes place in
the family home behind closed doors.231 The parties who are present
are hesitant to testify. The perpetrator cannot be forced to testify.
232
The spouse, although legally permitted, usually will not testify233 and
the victim for a number of reasons also will not testify.234 What evi-
dence is available is circumstantial.235  And it is difficult to prove any
case using just circumstantial evidence.
In addition, the data which is collected by the social worker during
the investigation is often inappropriate and insufficient to support an
adjudication. The investigation has focused on the need for protective
services not the possibility that a petition may be filed in court. If a
decision is made to file a petition, it is often long after the investigation
has been completed. What was clear in the minds of witnesses is now
cloudy and fragmented. And, finally, attorneys who present these
cases in court are often untrained, uninterested, unskilled and unpre-
pared.236
A number of states have recognized the difficulty of establishing
child abuse in a court of law and have attempted to make it somewhat
easier. These states have drafted their statutes in such a way that evi-
dence which is sufficient to establish a non-accidental injury is suffi-
cient to support an adjudication in the juvenile court.237 These states
do not require a showing of who did what to whom. If a non-accidental
injury is established by the State with the requisite burden of proof, the
230. For an excellent discussion of this topic see Burke, Evidentiary Problems of Proof in Child
Abuse Cases.- Why Family and Juvenile Courts Fail, 13(4) J. FAM. LAW 819 (1974); see also Note,
Indiana's Statutory Protection for the Abused Child, 9 VAL. L. REV. 89 (1974).
231. "Over 90% of the abuse incidents occurred in the child's home." D. GIL, VIOLENCE
AGAINST CHILDREN 34 (19-). For judicial recognition of the same fact see In re Edwards, 70
Misc. 2d 858, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Fam. Ct. 1972); Inre S., 66 Misc. 2d 683, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Fain.
Ct. 1971).
232. Since the juvenile court is characterized as being civil in nature, there is no real constitu-
tional issue of forcing an individual to testify against his own interests. As a practical matter, you
cannot force someone to testify if he/she doesn't want to testify.
233. See text accompanying notes 159-163, supra.
234. There are three reasons why the child will not or cannot testify. One: he is too young.
Two: he fears parental retaliation. Three: he fears for his parents' safety. See Comment, Child
Abuse-Another Attempt to Solve the Problem, 13 CATH. LAW. 231, 234 (1967); FONTANA, SOME-
WHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 27 (1973).
235. In re J. Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35 (N.D. 1971).
236. See Independent Representation, supra note 186, at 32.
237. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38(a)(O(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.46
(Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975).
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burden shifts to the parents238 or to the individuals who had custody of
the child at the time he was injured and are most likely to know how
that injury occurred. In effect, once a non-accidental injury is estab-
lished the burden of going forward is transferred to the parents.
239 If
the parents cannot provide a reasonable explanation for the injuries,
what has been presented will be sufficient to support the adjudication.
Protecting the Child's Interests: The Guardian Ad Litum
2 °
No one would argue that a child's safety and interests are not j eop-
ardized in a case of child abuse. Some would question, however, the
need for independent representation.
If a case of child abuse works its way into the juvenile court, there
are usually at least three attorneys involved; the judge, the attorney for
the parents and the attorney for the petitioner. It is sometimes argued
that this collection of legal expertise more than adequately represents
the child's interests. The answer is it does not.
When a petition alleging child abuse is filed and accepted by the
juvenile court, the child for all practical purposes becomes a ward of
the court.2'1 In slightly different terms, the juvenile court becomes the
child's guardian.24 2  As the child's guardian, it is the court's responsi-
bility to ensure that the child's safety and interests are fully pro-
tected.243 However, at the moment that the petition is filed, the issue
of child abuse has not been resolved. It is the juvenile court's responsi-
bility to weigh both sides of the argument and render a judicious and
equitable decision. The juvenile court that actively pursues and pro-
motes the child's interests, at this point in the proceedings, diminishes
its ability to render an equitable decision. The court may, however,
appoint a third party to protect the child's interests and temporarily
transfer its responsibilities. 24
238. See, e.g., In reJ. Z., 190 N.W.2d 27, 35 (N.D. 1971) (satisfactory excuse); In re Edwards,
70 Misc. 2d 858, 861, 335 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (1972) (satisfactory explanation); In re Frances, 49
Misc. 2d 372, 375, 267 N.Y.S.2d 556, 569 (1966) (reasonably explainable).
239. The constitutionality of such an approach was upheld in the case of In re S., 66 Misc. 2d
683, 690, 332 N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 (1971).
240. For a complete discussion of the Guardian Ad Litem see Independent Representation,
supra note 186.
241. This is true at least in respect to all issues before the court. See Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134
U.S. 650 (1890).
242. State v. Ferris, 369 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Mo. 1963).
243. Sangster v. Toledo Mfg., 193 Ga. 685, 19 S.E.2d 723 (1942).
244. In effect what the court does is to temporarily transfer its obligations. While it can tempo-
rarily transfer these obligations it cannot abrogate them. See Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 211,
79 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1954).
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In most cases of child abuse, it is the parents who are suspected of
inflicting the injuries. It should be obvious that an attorney hired by
the parents to protect their interests does not protect the child's inter-
ests. In the adjudicatory hearing the child's interests and the parents'
interests are diametrically opposed.
In almost all states, the petition alleging child abuse is filed by the
local department of social services. The petition is filed by the local
department on behalf of the child believed to have been abused. The
person who actually files the petition and presents the case is a city
attorney, county attorney or corporation counsel. It is argued that the
petition filed by the local department through the county attorney on
behalf of the child fully represents the child's interests. It does not.
The city attorney or county attorney is increasingly becoming a conduit
into the court for the local department of social services. It is the local
department of social services which receives and investigates the report,
analyzes the data, resolves the issues of diagnosis, prognosis and treat-
ment and decides whether or not to utilize the juvenile court.245 The
local department of social services usually does not make an adequate
investigation. It often lacks the necessary expertise to resolve the is-
sues of diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Department decisions are
often made on the basis of scarce resources and the cost of expensive
treatment rather than the child's needs. Finally, when the proceedings
actually begin, the city or county attorney is forced to assume a quasi-
prosecutorial role. If he is to reach the dispositional hearing he must
establish that child abuse did, indeed, take place. The necessity of es-
tablishing culpability or proving the allegations mitigates against the
single-minded attention that is necessary to adequately protect the
child's short- and long-range interests.
The child's needs are immediate and unique and should be the
pivotal issue of a juvenile court proceeding. Neither the judge, the
parents' attorney, nor the department's attorney adequately represent
those needs. There is a clear and demonstrable need to provide the
child with independent representation. In most states that representa-
tion is achieved by appointing a Guardian Ad Litum.
The Guardian Ad Litum is a special guardian appointed by the
court to represent the child's interests. 246 He is an active advocate for
the child. He represents neither the local department nor the parents.
He has no power or duties prior to his appointment or after the case has
245. In many counties it is the local department of social services which prepares the petition,
subpoenas the witnesses and prepares them for court.
246. Cumbie v. Cumbie, 245 S.C. 107, 139 S.E.2d 477 (1964).
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terminated.247 He has no power to interfere with the child's person or
property. He is not the child's legal guardian and he is not the child's
trustee.248 There is no requirement that the Guardian Ad Litum be an
attorney.249
In a case of child abuse, the Guardian Ad Litum has four func-
tions: he is an investigator whose task it is to ferret out all of the rele-
vant information; he is an advocate whose task it is to ensure that all of
the relevant information is before the court; he is a counsel whose re-
sponsibility it is to ensure that the court has before it all of the available
options for disposition; and he is a guardian in the simplest sense of the
word whose task it is to ensure that the child's short- and long-range
interests are addressed and fully protected.
Today, twenty-six states make provision for the independent rep-
resentation of an abused child.150  Provisions range from the simple
appointment of a Guardian Ad Litum to a listing of specific duties and
responsibilities. At a minimum, the Guardian Ad Litum should be
required to complete an independent investigation. He should have
the option of examining and cross-examining witnesses. He should
have the option of introducing his own witnesses and his own evidence.
And he should be required to make a final recommendation at the end
of each proceeding.
A court is under no obligation to accept the recommendations of
the Guardian Ad Litum. The degree to which a court will accept those
recommendations rests upon the Guardian Ad Litum's willingness to
explore the complexities of the problem, to develop his own expertis&,
to conduct his own thorough investigation, and upon his ability to ar-
ticulate to the court the reasons for his recommendations. Unfortu-
nately, few Guardians Ad Litum seem to demonstrate these
characteristics.
247. Blackwell v. Vance Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
248. Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 192 Cal. 343, 219 P. 999 (1923).
249. Maloney v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395, 403, 19 N.E. 848, 849 (1889).
250. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-11 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47:17:030(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817(a) (Cur. Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-113 (Cum. Supp.
1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a(f)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-821 (Supp. 1977);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3858 (Cur. Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.630 (Cur. Supp.
1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-15 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.160 (Cur. Supp.
1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-118 (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. § 9:6-8.43 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-283 (Cur. Supp.
1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-08 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B) (Page
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(B) (Supp. 1977); I1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2223 (Cur.
Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-14 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-10-180(A) (Cur. Supp. 1977);
S.D. Compiled LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12.1 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-7 (Supp. 1977); VA.
CODE § 16.1-266A (Cur. Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.053 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE
§ 49-6-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-122 (1977).
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Getting Better Mileage Out of What We Have: Cooperation and
Coordination
The single biggest problem today in the field of child abuse is a
lack of adequate treatment facilities for the child and his family. It is a
problem that will, in all likelihood, become more severe over the next
decade. The number of children identified as being abused and in
need of services will continue to grow. Treatment programs and serv-
ices will not keep pace. The resources which are available will be
stretched even thinner than they are today.
There is a popular belief that federal and state governments will
continue to increase their appropriation for child abuse services. The
possibility of that continuing spiral is quite remote. To expect and to
plan for new resources is to plan for failure. If America hopes to in-
crease its current capabilities for dealing with child abuse it has two
options: it can cast a critical eye, determine how its resources are now
being allocated, establish priorities and reallocate available resources;
or it can cast a critical eye, determine how its resources are now being
allocated and develop a framework which makes a more efficient use of
those available resources. On the basis of past history, it would seem
that the first option is not a realistic expectation. The second option is,
however, a possibility.
Available resources in the field of child abuse are often character-
ized as being scarce. When resources are described as being scarce it
does not mean that only a few agencies and organizations are dealing
with the problem. There are, in fact, a large number of agencies deal-
ing with child abuse. They include departments of social service, pro-
tective service, public health, mental health, maternal and child care,
police departments, probation departments, the courts, the schools and,
of course, hospitals. It often seems as if only a few organizations are
dealing with the problem because the organizations and agencies do
not communicate with each other. Communication is the first step to-
ward cooperation and cooperation is a condition precedent to coordi-
nation. A lack of coordination has just two results: a duplication of
efforts in some areas and a fragmentation of efforts in other areas. The
overall result is a very poor allocation of available resources. In a
word-waste.
A number of states have recognized the need to become more effi-
cient. To achieve this goal, these states have attempted to improve
cooperation and coordination between agencies. Sixteen states man-
date in their reporting statute cooperation and coordination between
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agencies.25 It is easy to mandate cooperation and coordination, but
far more difficult to design a framework to make cooperation and coor-
dination work. Unfortunately, the majority of states who provide for
cooperation and coordination have made no attempt to design any
framework.
A few states have been somewhat more creative. They have de-
veloped (sometimes by design, sometimes by luck) a system for devel-
oping that coordination. Five states require that a plan be developed
for the delivery of services and presented a specified period of time
before it takes effect.252 Coordination is required and public comment
is encouraged. The development of a plan is a condition precedent in
these states for the next year's funding. Three states have created state
councils or steering committees to monitor child abuse activities.253
These councils, if used wisely and creatively, could provide an ideal
vehicle for coordination. Finally, those states that have created child
protection teams 254 have, in fact, laid the groundwork and developed a
system which could be used to coordinate activities. This is true even
though the original purpose of the teams was diagnostic and not prag-
matic. The extent to which they will be used to coordinate services will
depend upon the vision and the creativity of their members.
CONCLUSION
Child abuse legislation, especially the reporting statute, has had a
remarkable history. Perhaps, no other type of legislation has so quick-
ly gained acceptance, has been so widely proclaimed as a panacea, and
has been so often amended and rewritten in such a short period of time.
America has a nasty habit of trying to legislate away its ills. Legis-
lation is liked because it requires little effort to draft, provides a great
deal of visibility for the authors, and costs very little unless an appro-
251. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 26-14-2 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38f (Cum. Supp. 1977); FLA.
STAT. § 827.07(6)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE §
235A.5(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(3) (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
722.628(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 425 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
110-119 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-12 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.40
(Page Supp. 1976); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2218 (Cum. Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 20-10-110-
120 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.17 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-114 (1977).
252. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 423(3) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-123
(1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1976); 11 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2216(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-115 (1977).
253. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 320.7 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) and CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 18950 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE § 235A.24 (Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.16 (Supp. 1977).
254. See text accompanying notes 210-212, supra (child protection team).
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priation is included. Legislation is not a panacea. It is a mover. It
pushes a problem from one group to another and it nudges attitudes
from one focal point to another.
Child abuse legislation has moved the problem from the research-
ers and the commentators to the agencies which must receive the re-
ports, investigate the reports and offer services. It has moved the
problem from the airy confines of academia to the trenches of the real
world. Unfortunately, the distance between those who dream of solu-
tions and those who must provide answers on a day-to-day basis is
enormous. The dreamers believe that legislation is a solution. It is not.
It is framework which, if it is properly constructed, can help to develop
reasonable and prudent answers.
Child abuse legislation has evolved through three stages. It was
conceived with the intent of identifying the child in peril. Its child-
hood and adolescence was spent tinkering and trying to fine tune the
system that must respond to reports. It now stands in the gray area
between adolescence and adulthood. It is a dangerous age, an age at
which decisions must be made.
The decisions which must be made deal with the future, and the
issue of the future is a simple one. Should America continue to devote
the majority of its efforts, expertise and resources to a costly system that
reacts to the problem or should it shift its focus? The focal point must
shift. To the extent that legislation reflects or anticipates that new fo-
cal point, it too must shift.
Shifting toward a new focal point requires a different perspective.
To be successful will require creativity, tenacity and planning. Its suc-
cess ultimately rests upon acceptance of the fact that it is too costly to
continue to react after the fact. The new focal point must be a com-
mittment to primary prevention. The new perspective must be an an-
ticipation of solutions.
There are three reasons which prompt a shift toward primary pre-
vention. One is philosophical, one is economic and one is just plain
common sense. (1) For a society that spends so much time reassuring
itself that it is child-oriented and humane, reacting to the problem after
the fact is arrogant and cruel. (2) The cost in terms of dollars of react-
ing to a problem after the fact is devastating. We cannot afford it. (3)
The cost of reacting to the problem is creating an ever-increasing resi-
due.
Every year 1 and 1/2% to 2% of our children are reported as sus-
pected victims of child abuse. While social agencies are working to
help this year's 2%, they are still trying to figure out what to do with
last year's 2% and are pleading with legislators for more money to
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deal with next year's 2%. The problems of abuse and neglect
accumulate at a rate of 1 and 1/2% to 2% more children each
year.255
The mandatory reporting statute has spent sixteen years being buf-
feted and tossed by what we perceive the problem of child abuse to be,
by the social service delivery system which was already in existence and
most recently by the federal government's actions. It is legislation
which, for many reasons, has been reactive. In a period of expanding
problems and contracting resources, perhaps it is time to lay it to rest.
Its epitaph should read: "it served in a time of need." Its legacy should
provide America with a framework upon which to build a more reason-
able and more efficient system for the next decade.
255. R. HELFER, THE PREVENTION OF SERIOUS BREAKDOWNS IN PARENT CHILD INTERAC-
TION, NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE (Summer 1978).
